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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
------0------
STATE OF UTAH, 
-vs.-
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
SUPREME COURT NO. 15412 
EMERY DEAN BECK, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
------0------
BRIEF OF APPELLAf-n 
------0------
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal action wherein the defendant 
was originally charged and tried for first degree murder. 
The jury was unable to reach a verdict and was discharged. 
Subsequent thereto, defendant entered a plea of guilty to 
murder in the second degree and was sentenced to an indeter-
minate sentence of five years to life. Defendant alleges 
certain errors in the original trial which, coupled with the 
possibility of the death penalty, deprived him of the oppor-
tunity to make a free and intelligent decision. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court, after the jury failed to. reach 
a verdict, discharged the jury. Subsequent thereto, the 
defendant entered a· plea of guilty to second degree murder. 
At sentencing, the court imposed the statutory sentence of 
five years to life but ordered that said sentence shall be 
served consecutive to any sentence the defendant was pre-
sently serving. The Court declined to hear certain post-
sentence motions of the defendant and he is presently at 
the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant herein respectfully seeks to have his 
plea of guilty vacated and be granted a new trial 
on charges of second degree murder. Alternatively, defend-
ant seeks to have the consecutive portion of his sentence 
suspended and be given credit for the time served pending 
trial and interim disposition of this matter. 
STATEMEHT OF FACTS 
The defendant has filed an Affidavit of Impecu-
niousity in this matter and, as a result of such condition, 
was unable to afford a complete transcript of these pro-
ceedings. As such, counsel has included certain statements 
-2-
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that are unsupported by record reference. In the 
event the State seriously questions any of such state-
ments, the defendant respectfully requests leave to have 
that particular portion transcribed. 
Defendant, at the cotmnencement of the time perti-
nent hereto, was serving a seven to ten year prison sentence 
in the State of Wyoming with a probable release date of 
November 12, 1982 (R.3). On June 28, 1976, a Complaint was filed 
charging the defendant with the first degree murder of High-
way Patrol Trooper William Antoniewicz (R.5). Said Complaint 
was acccompanied by a statement of probable cause (R.6). 
The defendant submitted a Motion to Dismiss on the basis 
of the failure of probable cause (R.8). Also filed was a 
Demand for a Law Trained Judge to preside at the prelim-
inary hearing (R.9). Argument on said motions were heard 
and denied (R.316-329). Upon completion of the prelimi-
nary hearing, the defendant was bound over to the district 
court to stand trial on the charges (R.421). The defendant 
again submitted the aforesaid motions to the district court 
(R.16) with supporting memoranda (R.17-22). Said motions 
were again denied. Several additional pre-trial motions 
not pertinent to this appeal were filed and in some fashion 
disposed of. 
At the conclusion of the State's case, at the time 
of trial, defendant moved for acquittal or, alternatively, 
-3-
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for dismissal of the charges against the defendant for 
failure to prove 1) that the victim was a peace officer 
and 2) that the victim was acting in a manner protected 
. 
by the statute (R.442-450). Said motion was denied (R.450). 
After completion of the defendant's case, the jury retired 
to deliberate. The jury was unable to reach a verdict and 
was discharged (R.288). 
Subsequent to the first trial, the State amended 
its information to allege second degree murder (R.294) and 
defendant entered a plea of guilty thereto (R.296). 
Prior to defendant pleading guilty, he was 
advised of the probable length of his sentence (Exhibits 
"A", "B", and "C" attached hereto). 
At the time set for sentenceing the Court imposed 
the statutory sentence of five years to life (R.302, 303) 
and also indicated that such sentence would run consecu-
tively with his Wyoming sentence (R.302, 303). Objection 
to such sentencing was noted (R.302). Within two weeks of 
the committment, defendant filed a Motion to Allow Credit 
for Jail Time Served (which was approximately one year) 
and to amend the sentence as it pertained to the imposition 
of consecutive sentences (R. 304, 305). Without notice 
or hearing, the Court determined it no longer had juris-
diction and summarily denied both motions (R. 306). This 
matter was then appealed. 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS, PURSUANT TO 
AMENDMENT V OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AND ARTICLE I, § 7 OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH, ENTITLED TO A PRE-
LIMINARY HEARBG BEFORE A 
LAW TRAINED JUDGE 
Both the Constitution of the United States and 
the State of Utah provide that no person shall be deprived 
of life or liberty without due process. Defendant believes 
that, as such, it is violate of these provisions to deny 
defendant a preliminary hearing before a law trained judge. 
The Utah legislature reacted, in its 1975 general 
session, to a growing concern across the country regarding 
this problem by enacting §78-5-4, Utah Code Annotated (1953), 
which provides that a defendant has the right to be tried 
and sentenced before a judge who is a member of the Utah 
State Bar. The statute is, however, silent as to that right 
with regards to a preliminary hearing. However, it should 
be noted that in grand jury proceedings, the alternative 
to preliminary hearings, provisions are made for the presence 
of, or accessability to, a district judge. A defendant should 
not be denied that right simply because an alternative method 
was chosen. See §77-18-1.1 and §77-19-9, UCA (1953). 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Shelmidine v. Jones, 
550 P.2d 207 (1975), stated: 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"It is thus seen that in a consid-
erable portion of our State there 
are some very practical problems in 
placing restrictions upon justices of 
the peace and requiring professional 
~ourts to handle minor offenses. If 
it were not for those justices in our 
sparsely populated rural counties an 
accused would of ten encounter incon-
venience in delay of time and distance 
of travel before he could have his 
case diposed of. It seems to be a 
sound observation that continues to 
serve a useful purpose by providing 
a readily accessible and expeditious 
means of handling minor cases; and 
that it is more than an aid in assur-
ing the constitutional guarantees of 
a speedy disposition of one's case, 
and thus of due process of law, than 
the contrary. (Emphasis added). 
The Court's reasoning is certainly well taken. How· 
ever, an examination of that reasoning substantiates defend-
ant's claim. The Court held that in minor cases due process 
is best served by permittine; the accused easy and convenient 
access to the courts. In severe felonies, as is the case 
here, that reasoning falls and rightfully so. In this instani 
the inconvenience that may be suffered by the defendant is so 
insignificant as to be negligible when weighed against the 
possible sentence herein. 
In addition, the holding of a preliminary hear· 
ing before a non-law-trained judge violates the equal protec· 
tion clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The fac: 
that a defendant is charged with an offense in a sparsely pop· 
ulated or urincorporated area should not work so as to deprive 
him of his rights. It is to be noted that a person charged 
with an offense in Salt Lake City, for instance, would have 
a preliminary hearing before a city judge, whom, by statute, 
must be law-trained (§78-4-8, UCA 1953). It can readily 
-6-
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be assumed that such individuals are more cognizant of basic 
legal procedures and requirements than are lay judges. Such 
knowledge is fi.mdamental in the protection of a defendant's 
basic rights and such rights should not be tampered with as 
a mere result of the location of the charge. 
POINT II 
THE STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
ON FILE HEREIN FAILS TO MEET THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF AMENDMENT IV OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH IN THAT IT FAILED TO SET 
FORTH SUFFICIENT FACTS TO JUSTIFY 
Ai'l' INDEPENDAUT FINDING BY A MAG-
I STRATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE CAPABLE 
OF SUPPORTING A WARRANT ARH.EST. 
A review of the complaintant's statement of prob-
able cause shows only one allegation that pertains to the 
defendant: "The defendant, Emery Dean Beck, has been indenti-
fied as the murderer of William Antoniewicz by witnesses and 
by the defendant's own admission." The Supreme Court of the 
United States has, on several occasions, held that such a 
minimal statement is not sufficient to support a warrant of 
arrest. 
The Complaint must contain an affirmative allegation 
that the affiant spoke with personal knowledge of the matters 
contained in the statement of probable cause. Giordenello v. 
~. 357 U.S. 480. 
Recitals of some of the underlying circumstances 
in the statement is essential if the magistrate is to perform 
his detached function and not serve as a rubber stamp for 
- 7-
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the police. U.S. v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102. 
A statement based only on suspicion without any 
statement of adequate supporting facts is insufficient for 
issuance of a warrant. Nathanson v. U.S., 290 U.S. 41. 
A Complaint must: 1) contain an affirmative alle-
gation that the complaintant spoke with personal knowledge 
of the matters contained therein; 2) indicate the sources 
for complaintant' s belief; 3) set forth any other sufficient 
information upon which a finding of probable cause could be 
made. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108. In reviewing the 
statement supplied herein, it is clear that it fails totally 
to meet the first requirement, makes no reference to the 
so1:1rces except as "witnesses", and totally fails to set 
forth any other information sufficient to support a magis-
trate's finding of probable cause. 
In Aguilar, supra, the Court held that the state-
ment not only contained "no affirmative allegation that the 
affiant spoke with personal knowledge of matter contained 
therein, it does not even contain an affirmative allegation 
that the affiant's unidentified source spoke with personal 
knowledge". In this case, as in Aguilar, the complaintant's 
statement is fatally defective and must be quashed. The 
Court also required, in Aguilar, that the ma8istrate must be 
informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which 
the informant concluded that a crime had been committed by 
-8-
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the accused as well as some of the underlying circumstances 
from which the complaintant concluded that the source was 
credible and his information reliable. The statement 
relied upon herein totally fails to meet requirements set 
forth by the Court. 
In Soinelli v. U.S., 393 U.S. 410, 416, the 
Court states: 
"Applying these principles to the pre-
sent case, we first consider the weight to 
be given the informer's tip when it is con-
sidered apart from the rest of the affidavit. 
It is clear that a Commissioner could not cre-
dit it without abdicating his constitutional 
function. Though the affiant swore that 
his -confidant was "reliable", he offered the 
magistrate no reason in support of this con-
clusion. Perhaps even more important is the 
fact that Aguilar's other test has not been 
satisfied. The tip does not contain suffi-
cient statement of the underlying circumstances 
from which the informer concluded that Spin-
elli was running a bookmaking operation. 
We are not told how the FBI's source 
received his information - it is not alleged 
that the informant personally observed Spin-
elli at work or that he placed a bet with 
him. Moreover, if the informant came by the 
information indirectly, he did not explain 
why his sources were reliable. Cf. Jaben v. 
United States, 381 U.S. 214, 85 S.Ct. 1365, 
T"4 L.Ed. Zd. 345 (1965). In the absence of 
a statement detailing the manner in which the 
information was gathered, it is especially 
important that th~ tip describe the ~ccused's 
criminal activity in sufficient detail that 
the magistrate may know that he is relying 
on something more substantial than a casual 
rumor circulating in the underworld or an 
accusation based merely on an individual's 
general reputation." 
See also, Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 566; Johnson 
v. U.S.,333 U.S. 10; Rugendorf v. U.S., 376 U.S. 528. 
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The Court's attention is further invited to the 
·particular section which charges the defendant with first 
degree murder, §76-5-202. nowhere does the statement of 
probable cause offer even the slightest fact which would 
substantiate the charge of first degree murder. It should 
further be noted that no witnesses were ever called who 
identified defendant as the murderer as per the allegation 
of the statement of probable cause. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRAl"lTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE STATE'S 
CASE 
The defendant was charge with violating §76-5-202 
(l)(e), murder in the first degree, to-wit: 
"76-5-202(l)(e). The homicide 
was connnitted for the purpose 
of avoiding or preventing an 
arrest by a peace officer act-
ing under the color of le8al 
authority or for the purpose 
of effectuating an escape from 
lawful custody." 
The state failed to prove elements necessary to 
sustain a conviction upon that charge. 
A. 
The state failed to establish in any manner that 
Trooper Antoniewicz was witness to any offense, was in the 
process of arresting anyone, or had called in any offense. 
that hl.. s ci· tation book and ser-In fact, the testimony was 
vice revolver were both in their places, evidencing a pre-
sumption contrary to an arrest. 
-10-
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B. 
William Antoniewicz was not a peace officer 
within the purview of the statute. Title 67, Chapter 
15, UCA 1953, provides for the training of peace offi-
cers. §1 announces the intent of the legislature, 
to-wit: 
"67-15-1. To better promote and 
insure the safety and welfare 
of the citizens of this state 
... there is created ... the 
division of peace officer train-
ing ... II 
The division was the agency invested with the 
responsibility of training peace officers to "better pro-
mote and insure the safety and welfare of the citizens ... " 
§67-15-7, UCA 1953, reaffirms this intent by stating in part: 
"Hotwitilstanding any provisions of 
any general [,] special or local 
law or charter to the contrary, no 
person shall after July 1, 1968,~ 
receive an original appointment 
on a permanent basis as a peace 
officer of any law enforcement 
unit in this state unless such 
erson has reviousl been awarded 
a certi icate by t e connnissioner 
of public safety, attesting to his 
satisfactory coQ1¥letion of an 
approved peace o ficer basic 
training program; and every per-
son who is appointed on a tem-
porary basis, or for a peace ~ff~­
cer of any law enforcement unit in 
this state shall forfeit his posi-
tion as su~h unless he previously 
has satisfactorily completed, or 
within eighteen months from the 
date of his appointment satisfac-
torily completes, a peace off~cer 
basic training school for officers 
and is awarded a certificate 
attesting thereto."(Emphasis added). 
-11-
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It is apparent that the legislature, in man-
datory terms, has announced its intention that untrained 
individuals should not be performing the role of a 
peace officer. The undisputed evidence was that Mr. 
Antoniewicz had not completed peace officer training. 
The corpus delecti of this charge requires the state to 
prove that the victim was a peace officer within the mean-
ing of the statute. This is especially true where the 
defendant has raised a presumption contrary to the statute. 
The state made no effort to rebut this presumption and, 
in fact, were incapable of rebuttal. However, the Court, 
without any evidence in support thereof, on its own voli-
tion, undertook to argue the state's case. The Court 
stated: 
"All right. The other thing is that 
67-15-7 sets up, or contemplates set-
ting up, law enforcement or peace 
officers on the same basis that you 
have an appointment for a commission 
in the Military; that is, the first 
appointment you get is a temporary 
appointment pending either some fur-
ther certification or training or 
conduct or whatever, and the second 
one is the permanent appointment. 
The qualifying language with regard 
to the first paragraph is "perma-
nent". In the second phrase, after 
the semicolon, the qualifying word 
is the word "temporary". I point 
that out simply so you will know 
what the basis for my thinking is." 
(R.449). 
-12-
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This finding by the Court is without any evi-
dentiary foundation and is not within the purview of mat-
ters available for judicial notice by the Court. The 
obligation was on the state to prove that Mr. Antoniewicz 
was either trained or within an exception. They did 
neither and such failure cannot be salvaged by the unsub-
stantiated interpretations of the Court. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSIHG TO 
HEAR DEFENDAl.~T'S POST-SENTENCE 
MOTIONS 
As set forth, supra, the Court sentenced defend-
ant to an indefinite term, said term to run consecutively 
with other prison terms. Defendant, believing the Court's 
practice to be improper, filed a Motion to Amend Sentence 
(R.305). Additionally, the defendant moved for credit 
for time served (R.306). Said denial was purportedly 
based on the fact that defendant had been turned over to 
the warden of the state prison and, accordingly, the 
Court had been divested of further jurisdiction in the 
matter. Such determination is, however, unsupported by 
the statutory and case law of this state. The Court 
erroneously presumed that §77-62-3, UCA 1953, (granting 
the board of pardons the power to determine the length 
of sentences within the statutory perameters) divested the 
trial court from any jurisdiction whatsoever subsequent to 
sentencing and commitment. 
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It should be noted that no statutory authority 
for such position can be found. To the contrary, the 
courts have repeatedly stated that the trial court, under 
varying circumstances, has residual authority. In 
State v. Soper , 559 P. 2d 951, (1977), the Court through 
Justice Maughan announced: 
"A sentence in a criminal case is 
a final judgment, and one seeking 
to set aside such final order has 
the burden of producing convincing 
proof of fact which constitutes a 
legal ground for setting aside such 
sentence. A motion to set aside a 
plea after sentencing is addressed 
to the sound discretion of the 
trial court!' 
While defendant herein did not go to the extreme 
of moving to set aside the sentence, such authority is 
implicit in the above language. Defendant did not seek a 
reversal of the Court's sentence but only for clarification 
as to its term and the opportunity to present to the Court 
argument in support of his posi.tion that the Court erred in 
the manner of imposing sentence. Such reasoning was ear-
lier announced by Justice Maughan in State v. Garfield, 
552 P.2d 129 (1976). See also State v. Plum, 14 Utah 2d 
124, 378 P.2d 671 (1963). 
Correction of an erroneous action by the trial 
court is also a legitimate basis for allowing residual 
jurisdiction. See Henline v. Smith, 548 P.2d 1271 (1976); 
State v. Park, 17 Utah 2d 90, 404 P.2d 677, (1965); State 
-
v. Alexander, 15 Utah 2d 14, 386 P.2d 411; and State v. 
Bridge, 3 Utah 2d 281, 282 P.2d 1043 (1955). Such error 
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was alleged herein to the trial court and defendant was 
entitled to be heard thereon. If the court's ruling is 
upheld it can only mean that a defendant has no practical 
means of clarifying or correcting a sentence short of 
appeal. Certainly it cannot be argued that the board of 
pardons has the authority to amend said sentence. That 
authority lies initially with the trail court and 
secondarily with the appellate court in the event of 
abuse of discretion. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN SEN-
TENCING DEFENDA."fr TO 
CONSECUTIVES SENTENCES· 
As previously stated, at the time of sentencing, 
defendant was already serving a prison sentence in Wyoming. 
Aware of that fact, the Court, in sentencing the defendant 
in the instant matter, said: 
" ... it is the judgment of the 
Court that you be sentenced 
to the maximum sentence that 
the law permits, an indeter-
minate term in the Utah State 
Prison of not less than five 
years to the end of your life, 
and that the sentences run 
consecutive with any other 
sentence that iou ma! currently 
be serving." ( . 455- 56) 
(Emphasis added). 
The imposition of consecutive sentences is author-
ized by 76-3-401, UCA 1953, but is authorized with specific 
limitations. Subsection (2) of that section, for instance, 
provides: 
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"(2) A court shall consider the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses ... in determining whether 
to impose consecutive sentences." 
It is noted that the court is to consider not 
the singular offense but the "offenses". There is no 
showing by the record or by the court that inquiry was made 
into the Wyoming offense and certainly no showing that the 
"gravity and circumstances" of that offense were considered 
by the court. This failure to inquire and consider is 
augmented by the court's failure to reconsider the sentence 
as per Point IV of this Argument. But for such inquiry 
and consideration, the court is incapable of imposing con-
secutive sentences. 
In addition, subsection (4) indicates: 
"(4) If a court lawfully determined to 
impose consecutive sentences, the aggre-
gate minimum of all sentences imposed 
may not exceed twelve years' imprison-
ment and the aggregate maximum of all 
sentences imposed may not exceed thirty 
years' imprisonment. However, this 
limitation does not apply if an offense 
for which defendant is sentenced 
authorizes the death penalty or life 
imprisonment:" 
It is clear that the final sentence precludes 
the limitations imposed in the first part of the section. 
Certainly they would be precluded in this matter. 
Once precluded, all matters relying thereon must 
also be precluded. Contrary to that fact, the court 
imposed a consectuive sentence pursuant to subsection (5) (c) 
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which is wholly dependant upon the introductory language _ 
"(5) The limitation of subsec-
tion (4) applies: 
In circumventing the preclusion, the court was 
able to take cognizance of a fact that, but for such cir-
cumvention, could not have been taken into account, i.e. 
the sentence imposed in another court. 
Since the limitations of (4) do not apply in this 
case, neither do those of (5) and without those factors, 
the court was without authority to take judicial notice 
of another states actions in sentencing the defendant. 
POINT VI 
THE POSSIBLE IMPOSITION OF 
THE DEATH PENALTY rn PLEA 
BARGAINING IS UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL AS TENDING TO DEPRIVE 
DEFENDANT OF BASIC CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHTS AND FURTHER 
TENDING TO DEPRIVE DEFENDA.~T 
OF HIS ABILITY TO FREELY 
DETERMINE HIS COURSE. 
While defendant does not argue herein that Utah's 
death penalty is nessarily unconstitutional per se, it is 
argued that it can be, and in fact was in this case, employed 
in an unconstitutional fashion. A variety of courts 
have held on numerous occasions that plea bargaining is an 
acceptable means of disposing of criminal matters so long 
as the basic give-and-take concept remains viable. This 
Court has oft times stated the rule applied universally in 
determining the validity of a guilty plea. In State v. 
Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337 (1977), the Court at 338 announced: 
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" ... for a plea of guilty to 
be valid it must appear that 
the accused had clear under-
standing of the charge and 
without undue influence, coer-
cion, or improper inducement 
voluntarily entered such plea." 
See also Banks v. Turner, 29 Utah 2d 154, 506 
P.2d 73 (1973); Combs v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 397, 483 P.2d 
437 (1971); and Strong v. TurneJ; 22 Utah 2d 294, 452 P.2d 
323 (1969). 
Coercion, in this case, need not be assumed. The 
possible result of a trial in this matter was death. The 
entry of a guilty plea to a lesser charge assured the def~~ 
ant that he would not be put to death. What possible 
greater coercion or influence can be conceived but death? 
It is to be noted that prison time was not a frightening 
possibility to the defendant. He was, at the time of 
entering his plea, already serving a prison sentence in the 
State of Wyoming. Further, as set forth in the Affidavits 
attached hereto and marked Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", the 
defendant had information regarding the average time served 
for second degree murder. 
As sue~, t;he defendant was faced with the follow-
ing facts in arriving at his decision: 
1. Being presently under a conunitment to the 
Wyoming State Prison, to plead guilty and serve an average 
of seven years for the charge; or 
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2. Demand a trial and face a possible death pen-
alty. 
It is not unreasonable to assume that many persons 
under similar circumstances might choose the same course as 
did the defendant - this regardless of the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant. Such action does not provide the type of 
remedial or punitive action contemplated by plea bargaining. 
It is not inconceivable that an individual who is totally 
innocent of a first degree murder charge might choose to 
plead guilty to a reduced charge. Such an argument is not 
an indictment of plea bargaining in general in that in most 
instances it is a decision involving more or less time 
whereas in matters of the instant kind \t is a decision of 
life versus death - the ultimate decision and one that can-
not, under any circumstances, be taken lightly or assumed 
by way of a general rule fitting all cases alike. 
The United States Supreme Court has taken note of 
this situation and in United States v. Jackson, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 
390 U.S. 570 (1968), struck down the death penalty provision 
of the Federal Kidnapping Act. In so doing, the Court said: 
"Under the Federal Kidnapping 
Act, therefore, the defendant 
who abandoned the right to 
contest his guilt before a 
jury is assured that he cannot 
be executed; the defendant 
ingenious enough to seek a 
jury acquittal stands fore-
warned that, if the jury finds 
him guilty and does not.wish. 
to spare his life, he will die. 
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Our problem is to decide 
whether the Constitution 
permits the establishment 
of such a death penalty, 
applicable only to those 
defendants who assert the 
right to contest their 
guilt before a jury. The 
inevitable effect of any--
such provision, is of 
course, to discourage as-
sertion of the Fifth Amend-
ment right not to plead 
guilty and to deter exer-
cise of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to demand a jury 
trial. If the provsion 
had no other purpose or 
effect than to chill the 
assertion of constitutional 
rights by penalizing those 
who choose to exercise them, 
then it would be patently 
unconstitutional. But, as 
the Government notes, limit-
ing the death penalty to 
cases where the jury recom-
mends its imposition does 
have another objective: It 
avoids the more drastic al-
ternative of mandatory capi-
tal punishment in every case. 
In this sense, the selective 
death penalty procedure 
established by the Federal 
Kidnapping Act may be viewed 
as ameliorating the severity 
of the more extreme punishment 
that Congress might wish to 
provide. 
The Government suggests that 
the Act thus operates "to 
mitigate the severity of pun-
ishment," it is irrelevant 
that it "may have the inciden-
tal effect of inducing defend-
ants not to contest in full 
measure." We cannot agree. 
Whatever might be said of Con-
gress' objectives, they can-
not be pursued by means that 
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needlessly chill the exer-
cise of basic constitutional 
rights. Cf. United States v. 
Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 88 S.Ct. 
419, 19 L.Ed.2d 508; Shelton 
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-
489, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed. 
2d 231. The question is not 
whether the chilling effect is 
"incidental" rather than inten-
tional; the question is whether 
that effect is unnecessary and 
therefore excessive. In this 
case the answer to that question 
is clear. The Congress can of 
course mitigate the severity of 
capital punishment. The goal of 
limiting the death penalty to 
cases in which a jury recommends 
it is an entirely legitimate one. 
But that goal can be achieved 
without penalizing those defend-
ants who plead not euilty and 
demand jury trial. In some 
States, for example, the choice 
between life impri.sonment and 
capital punishment is left to 
jury in every case - regardless 
of how the defendant's guilt 
has been determined. Given the 
availibility of this and other 
alternatives, it is clear that 
the selective death penalty pro-
vision of the Federal Kidnapping 
Act cannot be justified by its 
ostensible purpose. Whatever 
the power of Congress to impose 
a death penalty for violation of 
the Federal Kidnapping Act, Con-
gress cannot impose such a penalty 
in a manner that needlessly penal-
izes the assertion of a constitu-
tional right. See Griffin v. State 
of California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 
1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106. 
It is no answer to urge, as does 
the Government that federal trial 
judges may be ~elie~ upon to.reject 
coerced pleas of guilty and invol-
untary waivers of jury trial. For 
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the evil in the federal 
statute is not that it 
necessarily coerces 
~uilty pleas and jury wiavers 
ut simply that it needlessly 
encourages them. A lrocedure 
need not be inherent y coer-
cive in order that it be held 
to impose an impermissible 
burden upon the assertion of a 
constitutional right. " 
See also Pope v. United States, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 
392 U.S. 651 (1968); Shapiro v. Thompson, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 
394 U.S. 618 (1969); McGuutha v. California, 91 S.Ct. 
1454, 402 U.S. 183 (1971). 
The use of the death penalty as a plea bargain-
ing tool is such as 11 to chill the assertion of consti-
tutional rights ... 11 and further tends to 11 ••• needlessly 
encourage ... 11 guilty pleas. Such use is not only chilling 
in those instances wherein the State may initially believe 
it has a legitimate capital offense but later reduces it, 
but also is evil in that it is conceivable if not probable 
that prosecutors may overcharge a suspect of first degree 
murder in order to coerce him into pleading guilty to the 
crime with which he should have been charged in the first 
instance. 
Surely the congestion of the courts, the cost to 
the taxpayer and other reasons connnonly set forth as justi· 
fication for plea bargaining cannot be used as justification 
for threatening a defendant with the death penalty in order 
to coerce him to plead guilty to a lesser charge. 
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POI~lT VII 
Section 76-5-202(l)(e), UCA 
1953, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS 
BEING IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 
I, §24, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
Article I, §24, Constitution of Utah, provides: 
"All laws of a general nature 
shall have uniform operation." 
Section 76-5-202 (l)(e), UCA 1953, the section 
with which defendant was originally charged with violating, 
purports to provide a penalty for the murder of a peace 
officer which is greater than that imposed for murdering 
other persons in similar circumstances. Defendant would 
not argue that peace officers are employed in a dangerous 
and necessary position. However, defendant does not contend 
that such a voluntary assumption of that position should not, 
to the exclusion of all other persons, act as a special pen-
alty for a crime cormnitted against them. An example may 
be of some value in discerning the lack of uniformity. 
Let us suppose that an individual is assaulted 
by another individual and the life of the first individual 
is in jeopardy but for the aid and assitance of a private 
citizen. In offering said aid, the private citizen is 
killed. The killer can be charged with second degree mur-
der. However, if by some coincidence the person aiding 
the assaulted person is a peace officer, his death is charg-
able as first degree murder. 
What justification can be used in such situation 
for imposition of a greater penalty for the peace officer? 
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It is granted that peace officers should be shielded 
against such offenses but it is no less conceded that a 
person assuming the role of a samaritan should also be 
sheilded. There appears to be no justification for the 
mandatory imposition of a first degree murder charge solely 
on the fact that the victim was a peace officer - in fact 
such a distinction violates aforesaid constitutional pro-
vision. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ____ day of 
~fr:vmJ w. ALLRED 
Attorney for Emery Dean Beck 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies 
of the above and foregoing Appellant's Brief were duly 
mailed, United States Post, postage prepaid, to the Attorney 
General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, on this day of ' 1978. 
-------
)JI 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
------0------
STATE OF UTAH, 
-vs.-
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
EMERY DEAN BECK, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
------0------
A F F I D A V I T 
No. 15412 
COMES NOW Emery Dean Beck and, being first duly 
sworn upon his oath, deposes and says: 
1. He is the defendant in the above-referenced 
matter. 
2. Prior to entering_ his guilty plea to murder 
in the second degree, he was advised by his counsel that 
the averai:;e prison terni served for said offense was between 
seven and eight years. 
3. Said information was considered in reaching 
his decision to plead guilty to said offense. 
4. Affiant felt that the options available to 
him, specifically the possioility of the death penalty, 
were so onerous as to preclude any choice but the one 
ultimately made. 
5. The decision to enter the guilty plea to a 
reduced charge was based on a fear of possible greater con-
sequences, not on the particular guilt or innocence of the 
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EXHIBIT "A" - Page 2 
defendant to the offense charged. 
6. But for the possible imposition of the death 
penalty, defendant would not have plead guilty but, to the 
contrary, would have insisted on a jury trial on the orig-
inal charges. 
DATED this ') , _ day of __ ,_-_-...;.''-:....' ....:'-.::::....__ _ , 1978. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Salt Lake ) 
On this 
SS. 
EMERY DEAN BECK 
Defendant-Affiant 
/ / 
/ 
day of ' ' ~~~~~-"----....:=...~~~~~· 1978, 
personally appeared before me Emery Dean Beck who, being 
first duly sworn upon his oath, acknowledged to me that he 
executed the foregoing instrument and that the contents 
thereof are true and correct to his best knowledge and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED AHD SWORN to before me on the day and 
date first above-written. 
My commission expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in:'»--
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EXHIBIT "B" 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
------0------
STATE OF UTAH, 
-vs.-
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
A F F I D A V I T 
EMERY DEAN BECK, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
------0------
No. 15412 
COMES NOW Stephen Love and, _being first duly sworn 
on oath, deposes and says: 
1. He is the director of parole for the State 
of Utah. 
2. Prior to the entry of defendant's guilty plea 
herein, affiant was contacted by defendant's counsel. 
3. Pursuant to counsel's inquiry, affiant advised 
counsel that the average prison term served for murder in 
the second degree was between seven and eight years. 
DATED this / C ..:0 day of ---'A'-'-"a~,-~--/ __ , 19 78. 
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EXHIBIT "B" - Page 2 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS. 
i- 0--
County of Salt Lake 
On this 
_ ___;C.."'- day of ~-·----r_,~'~h_,_, _ _,,_e__, _ ~• 1978, per-
sonally appeared before me Stephen Love who, being first 
duly sworn upon his oath, acknowledged to me that he exe-
cuted the foregoing Affidavit and that the contents thereof 
are true and correct to his best knowledge and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on-the day and 
date first above-written. 
' ---;------~---~=-...,,--------~-~----- ~~-NOTARY PUBLIC - >' I I 
Residing in: \-r-'- / , i-':~ G- !1 . ,_ { '.)~ -
Hy commission expires: 
I /, / 
.\ 
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EXHIBIT "C" 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
------0------
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
A F F I D A V I T 
-vs. -
EMERY DEAN BECK, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
------0------
No. 15412 
COMES NOW Steven W. Allred and, being first duly 
sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. He is, and has been at all times pertinent 
hereto, counsel for the defendant. 
2. Prior to the entry of defendant's guilty plea 
herein, affiant contacted Stephen Love, director of parole 
for the State of Utah. 
3. Pursuant to affiant' s inquiry, Hr. Love 
advised affiant that the average prison term served for mur-
der in the second degree was between seven and eight years. 
4. Said information was transmitted to defendant 
for his consideration in determining the advisability of 
entering the guilty plea ultimately entered herein. 
DATED this day of ----~-- ' 1978. 
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EXHIBIT "G" - Page 2 
STATE OF UTAH 
SS. 
County of Salt Lake 
' ''-1,,.... 
On this ~day of __ 11 .... · ,...."-· _/_' ---.._....._, 1978, per-
sonally appeared before me Steven W. Allred who, being first 
duly sworn upon his oath, acknowledged to me that he exe-
cuted the foregoing Affidavit and that the contents thereof 
are true and correct to his best knowledge and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED AHD SWORN to before me on the day and 
date first above-written. 
My commission expires: 
.--/ / / r: ..----- / "'_ / J' . ----. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in:.\-''" 
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